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There is little room for reaching an agreement on the status of Kosovo 
that is acceptable to all parties. All signs point toward a destabilizing 
status quo should the Kosovars unilaterally declare independence. Be-
cause the conflict over Kosovo threatens to undermine stability and de-
mocratic transformation throughout the region, the European Union must 
use all available political power in pressuring both sides to compromise.
After years of discussion, developments in 
the question of Kosovo’s bid for independ-
ence could once again take a turn for the 
worse. On December 10, the Balkan Con-
tact Group submitted its report on the lat-
est attempts to mediate between Kosovo-
Albanians and the Serbian government to 
UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon. For 
the past four months, a trio of practiced 
diplomats from the European Union, 
United States and Russia have been pursu-
ing every possible avenue of agreement 
between the two parties.  
 
The European Union has not been able to 
offer any of its own solutions to the crisis 
as long as these negotiations have been 
ongoing. However, as of December 10, the 
European Union is free to define an alter 
 
native course of action and to use its po-
litical weight in achieving its goals.   
 
As events now threaten to quickly spiral 
out of control, the European Union must be 
swift and clear in communicating its goals. 
Kosovo’s prime minister, Agim Ceku, has 
stated for months that the Kosovo Parlia-
ment will declare independence by the 
year’s end, irrespective of what happens 
during the talks. Adding fuel to the fire, 
his designated successor, Hashim Thaci, 
who is a former leader of the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army (UCK), declared the dawn of 
a new era after his Democratic Party won 
parliamentary elections in November 
2007. The Serbian government, for its 
part, has threatened that there will be far-
reaching consequences should Kosovo uni-
laterally declare independence. 
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I  
A recent history of events 
The international community has grappled 
with the question of Kosovo’s status for 
years. Negotiations between Kosovo Alba-
nians and the Serbian government began 
in 2006 under the direction of UN Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. After 14 months of 
negotiations failed to make headway on 
the issue, Finland’s former president pro-
posed a solution in February 2007 that 
envisioned a supervised independence 
for Kosovo with limited sovereignty. 
 
Under Ahtisaari’s proposal, a powerful 
international representative capable of 
presiding over an EU mission would re-
lieve the UN mission currently operat-
ing in the region. The Representative of 
the International Community would 
oversee the implementation of the solu-
tion and intervene in Kosovar politics if 
and when necessary. Ahtisaari’s pro-
posal also foresees the expansion of 
constitutional democracy with decen-
tralized institutional structures, guar-
anteed minority rights and comprehen-
sive protection for the sites of orthodox 
Serbian cultural heritage spread 
throughout Kosovo. As the plan also 
foresees Kosovo’s right to sign interna-
tional agreements and apply for mem-
bership in international organizations, 
it is directed at de facto sovereignty for 
an independent Kosovo.  
 
Whereas Kosovo Albanians have sup-
ported the plan, the Serbian govern-
ment has rejected it. Belgrade has 
found support for its position in Mos-
cow, which has blocked moves toward 
conditional independence for Kosovo in 
the UN Security Council. 
 
After it became clear in the summer of 
2007 that the Athisaari proposal would 
not pass the Security Council, the Bal-
kan Contact Group called for a new round 
of talks to begin in August 2007. The 
troika of EU, U.S. and Russian representa-
tives was to provide Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs with yet another opportunity to 
agree on a compromise. 
 
However, these talks have similarly failed 
to bring the parties to mutual agreement. 
Both sides have remained intransigent, 
unable to reach a compromise position re-
garding the status of Kosovo in interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, they have made 
some political and psychological gains 
during the process:  
•  Out of the negotiations emerged a new 
conceptual and methodological substance. 
The international community has proposed  
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several ways out of the current deadlock, 
ranging from the Ahtisaari plan to the 14-
point troika paper to EU mediator Wolf-
gang Ischinger’s suggestion of basing fu-
ture relations on the model of the German-
German agreement of 1972. The Serbian 
government as well as the so-called Unity 
Team of Kosovo Albanians have also pro-
posed procedures and solutions that will 
have an impact on future relations. These 
include the Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement advocated by Kosovo Albanians 
and the “Taiwan solution” or the so-called 
Hong Kong model, which the Serbian gov-
ernment supports.  
 
•  In psychological terms, the troika talks 
have been a test of flexibility for both par-
ties. Although both sides have steadfastly 
held their ground on core issues, they 
have shown some flexibility and, in their 
own way, a desire to find a feasible ap-
proach for the future. They have also ac-
knowledged the need to develop new 
terms capable of describing the current 
reality. A continued and structured dia-
logue between Kosovo Albanians and the 
Serbian government is the missing factor 
that must be provided after December 10. 
 
•  The negotiation process itself has raised 
awareness of the Kosovo question within 
the European Union. The EU has had to 
make the issue’s relevance clear to those 
member states whose foreign and Euro-
pean policies have not traditionally been 
concerned with Southeast Europe. Today, 
there is widespread acceptance in the 
European Union – even beyond the Euro-
pean members of the Contact Group – of 
the fact that this is a European issue and 
that the Union has a specific responsibility 
in the process. 
 
II 
The constellation of        
interests and risks  
Though somewhat productive, the troika 
talks have been inconclusive as the goal of 
finding a solution palatable to both sides 
proved infeasible. As foreseen by Kai Eide 
in 2005, the political process set in motion 
by the UN now threatens to take a sharp 
turn down the wrong path.  
 
Elections for Kosovo’s provisional parlia-
ment were held in November 2007 near 
the close of the troika talks. Riding on the 
wings of its democratic legitimation, the 
provisional parliament will clearly want to 
act on its perceived mandate – despite a 
low electoral turnout of 45 percent and the 
fact that the majority of Kosovo’s Serbian 
population boycotted the elections. 
 
For their part, the Kosovo Albanian par-
ties, which are bolstered by U.S. support, 
fear the loss of the current momentum in 
which a growing number of Western states 
are pushing to bring a decisive end to the 
status debate. 
“A new conceptual and 
methodological substance  
emerged.” 
A unilateral and unconditional declaration 
of independence by Kosovo would, how-
ever, unleash several unpredictable devel-
opments. Should such a declaration force 
the question of recognizing an independ-
ent and sovereign Kosovo, Belgrade and 
Moscow would act to block Kosovo’s ac-
cess to international institutions for an in-
definite period. Other possible results in-
clude a backlash in the northern region 
governed by Belgrade and divisions along 
ethnic lines, both of which could lead to 
copycat effects in the Balkan and else-
where. It remains unclear whether a solid 
legal and political framework for the 
planned EU mission can in fact be estab-
lished. 
 
The consensus among the majority of the 
political elite in Belgrade is that Kosovo 
can, at best, be granted far-reaching 
autonomy. It was not until 2006 that Ser-
bia asserted its claim to Kosovo in a 
constitutional referendum. Whereas Presi-
dent Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS)  
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has been somewhat constructive in ap-
proaching the Kosovo issue, domestic po-
litical pressure in Serbia should not to be 
underestimated.  
 
Indeed, the Serbian Radical Party, embold-
ened by its January 2007 electoral victory 
in parliament, views the Kosovo issue as a 
key question affecting the fate of the Ser-
bian nation, as does Prime Minister Vo-
jislav Kostunica’s party. The Serbian gov-
ernment therefore demands that talks on 
Kosovo be continued.  
 
Prime Minister Kostunica has been clear 
in stating that the UN Security Council 
must play a central role in finding a solu-
tion acceptable to Serbia. Should Kosovo 
unilaterally declare its independence, the 
Serbian government has threatened to re-
taliate by enacting a trade embargo, clos-
ing the borders, halting the delivery of en-
ergy supplies and even partitioning Kos-
ovo. 
 
An immediate recognition of Kosovo by the 
United States and European countries 
would have an incalculable but profound 
effect on domestic politics in Serbia. If 
Kosovo declares independence before 
presidential elections in February 2008, 
the work of those advocating democracy in 
Serbia will be undermined, and the proc-
ess of democratic transformation threat-
ened.  
 
III 
Russia and the United    
States 
The burden of responsibility in the upcom-
ing weeks is not to be carried by Pristina 
and Belgrade alone. The continued diver-
gent interests of the United States and 
Russia undermine attempts to ensure a 
constructive ne-
gotiation proc-
ess. 
 
The United 
States supports 
an independent 
Kosovo state. As 
recently as June 
2007, President 
Bush spoke out 
against an “end-
less dialogue” on 
the issue during 
his visit to Ti-
rana. Washing-
ton has become 
increasingly vo-
cal in pushing 
for the West’s 
recognition of 
Kosovo as an in-
dependent state – even without a UN Se-
curity Council resolution, if necessary.  
 
The Bush administration is clearly driven 
by the need to claim as many foreign pol-
icy success stories as possible before the 
end of the president’s term. Washington is 
also interested in reducing the number of 
U.S. troops in Southeast Europe. Yet this 
requires that stability be established in 
the region, a prospect which is, according 
to the U.S. point of view, achievable with 
simple solutions. The fact that the pre-
dominantly Muslim Kosovo Albanians con- 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K
o
s
o
v
o
:
 
W
h
a
t
 
n
e
x
t
?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
 
5
 
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
9
stitute one of the most pro-U.S. population 
groups in the world is of particular impor-
tance to the United States, which does not 
want to disappoint their expectations of 
independence. 
 
Russia’s geostrategic interests in the 
Western Balkans are limited, although 
Russian companies have growing invest-
ments in the region. The Russian govern-
ment has stated that it would accept only a 
solution that is also acceptable to Serbia. 
But Moscow is clearly using the current 
situation as a means of jockeying for posi-
tion in the broader realm of international 
politics.  
 
Whether the issue be Iran or the missile 
defense shield in Eastern Europe, Russia is 
quick to flex its muscle as a world power. 
Though such posturing is understandable 
given that the United States has repeat-
edly bypassed Russia in decisions of 
global importance since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, it does not change the 
fact that such actions make Moscow a dif-
ficult partner. Shortly before the end of the 
troika-mediated talks, Russia’s envoy, 
Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, empha-
sized the need for a sustainable compro-
mise palatable to both sides and called for 
the continuation of talks.  
 
 
IV 
Cornerstones of a new EU 
policy  
Given the current constellation of inter-
ests, it is unlikely that either the Contact 
Group or the UN Security Council, which 
will not convene to discuss the Kosovo is-
sue until December 19, will play much of a 
role in the coming months. As in the past, 
Russia can be expected to push for contin-
ued negotiations and against the U.S. drive 
to end talks. 
 
Willingly or not, the European Union will 
become, as of December 10, the key player 
in the Kosovo process. It is up to the Euro-
pean Union and its diplomatic skill to find 
a way out of the deadlock toward a frame-
work that would allow Serbia and Kosovo 
to coexist peacefully and guarantee stabil-
ity in the region. For starters, the Euro-
pean Union must find a way to contain the 
divisive processes already underway.  
 
The Council of the European Union should 
not wait until the Security Council con-
venes on December 19th to make a clear 
statement. It must be prepared to define 
its position on the issue at the summit on 
December 14. The signals communicated 
here will be vitally important to the re-
gion’s future. The following four working 
points should guide EU action:  
“Russia’s geostrategic  
interests in the Western 
Balkans are limited.” 
•  Demand consensus on a declaration of 
status On December 14, the Council 
should be unequivocal in stating that the 
Kosovo Albanians cannot expect support 
should they take unilateral steps without 
consensus. Whereas a declaration by the 
Kosovo Parliament on the status of Kosovo 
cannot be prevented, the form and sub-
stance of such a declaration are critical. 
Any such declaration should express the 
political will to implement the Ahtisaari 
plan in cooperation with the international 
community. The declaration must clearly 
invite the international community as well 
as the European Union to oversee Kosovo 
sovereignty in the next few years within 
the framework of the Ahtisaari plan. 
N A T O ’ s  p r e s e n c e  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u e s t e d  t o  
continue the guarantee of security in the 
country. 
 
A declaration of status along these lines 
could serve as the basis for the European 
Union to relieve the UN mission in Kosovo 
within the framework of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244. The European 
Union would officially acknowledge the 
declaration. The European Union would of-
ficially take cognizance of the declaration.   
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But it is imperative that the member states 
reach a consensus on the issue of official 
recognition. The option of a transition pe-
riod in which the European Union super-
vises the development of viable Kosovar 
institutions could provide a compromise 
solution for those states that disagree over 
the issue of recognition. EU member states 
could then unite in recognizing Kosovo of-
ficially – at the latest – until the start of 
accession talks.   
 
At the same time, however, communica-
tion with Serbia must continue without in-
terruption. The European Union should 
therefore insist that the declaration em-
phasize the need for special relations with 
Serbia. The declaration should invite Ser-
bia to engage in dialogue on issues regard-
ing Serbia directly or the Serbian minority 
and Serbian cultural interests in Kosovo. 
The status declaration should be made af-
ter Serbia’s presidential elections have 
been conducted. Exploiting nationalist 
sentiments for political advantage in the 
upcoming presidential campaign will not 
advance the interests of an independent 
Kosovo or that of Serbian democracy. This 
is a real and present danger.  
 
•  Bearing responsibility in Kosovo: The 
European Union must demonstrate its will-
ingness to assume responsibility within 
the framework of the Ahtisaari plan. The 
planned EU mission would be the largest 
civil operation ever undertaken under the 
direction of the EU Security and Defense 
Policy. Its mandate in Kosovo would in-
clude executive police duties as well as 
judicial functions. 
 
Kosovo faces immense challenges; its eco-
nomic situation is bleak and not only be-
cause of the unresolved issue of its status. 
The European Union will have to battle 
with organized crime and endemic corrup-
tion. Added to this are the major chal-
lenges posed by the prospect of returning 
refugees and the integration of minorities, 
especially Serbs, into the new political and 
social order. Massive efforts must be made 
in developing all aspects of a constitu-
tional democracy. It is therefore impera-
tive that the European Union hire qualified 
personnel for service in Kosovo. As they 
are responsible for the recruitment, the 
member states bear a particular responsi-
bility in this capacity. 
 
It is equally important that actors within 
the European Union cooperate so as to 
avoid, for example, institutional conflicts 
between the Commission and the Council. 
Should the European Union succeed in act-
ing cohesively, it would be able to relieve 
NATO of its peacekeeping duties in the re-
gion. 
 
•  Redefine the region’s relationship with 
Europe: Efforts to facilitate positive devel-
opments in Kosovo must be accompanied 
by a revised EU policy on the region. 
 
This includes the European Union making 
concessions to the Western Balkan states 
that reach beyond those of the Stabiliza-
tion and Association Process (SAP). Al-
though each new step introduced into the 
accession process is often driven by a 
powerful symbolism, the SAP is frequently 
perceived as a primarily technical process. 
One of the most urgent measures entails 
relaxing Schengen states’ visa require-
ments for citizens of Western Balkan 
countries. For many in the region, remov-
ing strict visa requirements would miti-
gate their sense of being snubbed by 
Europe. 
“Strengthening a  
democratic Serbia.”  
In addition, Serbia in particular must be 
given the opportunity to continue building 
a promising future with Europe. Now de-
mocratic, Serbia has taken great strides 
toward EU accession in recent years. The 
European Union has responded by provid-
ing financial support within the framework 
of the EU pre-accession funds.  
 
Of equal – if not greater – importance is 
the need to cultivate a sense of symbolic 
and substantial achievement reaching  
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deeper than everyday infrastructural in-
vestment. The European Council, sched-
uled for December 14, should think about 
a future EU-Balkan-summit. This summit 
could be organized by the two upcoming 
EU presidencies, as both Slovenia and 
France have distinct ties to the region. A 
summit should be scheduled for 2008 in 
Belgrade. It should aim to strengthen the 
prospects of accession for the entire re-
gion and focus on a new form of partner-
ship between the EU and states in the re-
gion.  
 
•  Engage both Moscow and Washington in 
the process: Resolving the question of 
Kosovo’s status is primarily a European 
issue. The European Union currently bears 
the brunt of the financial burden. EU 
member states are the first to be affected 
by crises in the region. Both the United 
States and Russia must be made aware of 
the fact that unilateral courses of action 
will not result in a net gain. 
The European Union must convince the 
United States that Kosovo’s unilateral dec-
laration of independence entails too many 
risks. At the same time, the European Un-
ion must impress upon the Russian gov-
ernment that allowing the situation to re-
main unresolved is no solution. 
 
It must be made absolutely clear that the 
Western Balkans can no longer be ex-
ploited by states jockeying for position in 
international politics. Both the United 
States and Russia will remain active in the 
region, and the European Union needs 
them as partners there. The central in-
strument in the process remains the Bal-
kan Contact Group. Despite its recent fail-
ures, the Contact Group should continue to 
work toward progress, as both Moscow and 
Washington will prove crucial to any solu-
tion. 
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